Does the social Cost of Carbon Matter?: An Assessment of U.S. Policy by Hahn, R. W. & Ritz, Robert
 
UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE
Cambridge Working 
Papers in Economics 
 
Does the Social Cost of Carbon Matter?:      
An Assessment of U.S. Policy 
 
Robert W. Hahn and Robert A. Ritz 
CWPE 1346 & EPRG 1323 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Does the Social Cost of Carbon Matter?:              
An Assessment of US Policy 
 
 
 
Robert W. Hahn and Robert A. Ritz 
 
 
 
October 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
CWPE 1346 & EPRG 1323 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Does the Social Cost of Carbon Matter?:        
An Assessment of U.S. Policy 
EPRG Working Paper      1323 
Cambridge Working Paper in Economics      1346 
Robert W. Hahn and Robert A. Ritz 
 
 
Abstract We evaluate a recent U.S. initiative to include the social cost of carbon (SCC) 
in regulatory decisions. To our knowledge, this paper provides the first systematic test of the 
extent to which applying the SCC has affected national policy. We examine all economically 
significant federal regulations since 2008, and obtain a surprising result: Putting a value on 
changes in carbon dioxide emissions does not generally affect the ranking of the preferred 
policy compared with the status quo. Overall, we find little evidence that use of the SCC has 
affected U.S. policy choices to date. We offer an explanation related to the political economy 
of regulation. 
 
Keywords  Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Social Cost of Carbon ; Climate Policy ; 
Regulatory Innovation 
 
JEL Classifications H43 (Project Evaluation) ; K32 (Environmental Law) ; Q51 (Valuation 
of Environmental Effects) ; Q58 (Environmental Policy) 
 
Contact robert.hahn@smithschool.ox.ac.uk; rar36@cam.ac.uk 
Publication  October 2013  
www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Does Using the Social Cost of Carbon Matter?: 
An Assessment of U.S. Policy 
 
Robert W. Hahn and Robert A. Ritz 
October 2013 
 
 
Abstract 
We evaluate a recent U.S. initiative to include the social cost of carbon (SCC) in 
regulatory decisions. To our knowledge, this paper provides the first systematic test of 
the extent to which applying the SCC has affected national policy. We examine all 
economically significant federal regulations since 2008, and obtain a surprising result: 
putting a value on changes in carbon dioxide emissions does not generally affect the 
ranking of the preferred policy compared with the status quo. Overall, we find little 
evidence that use of the SCC has affected U.S. policy choices to date. We offer an 
explanation related to the political economy of regulation.  
 
 
 
 
*Mr. Hahn is director of economics and a professor at the Smith School of Enterprise 
and the Environment, University of Oxford; a senior fellow at the Georgetown Center for 
Business and Public Policy; and a Robert Schuman fellow at the European University 
Institute. Mr. Ritz is university lecturer in economics, University of Cambridge and a 
research associate, Energy Policy Research Group. We gratefully acknowledge the 
excellent research assistance of Sarah Ridout and Kevin Soter. We would also like to 
thank David Frame, Michael Greenstone, Elizabeth Kopits, Albert McGartland, Michael 
Pollitt, and Paul Watkiss for very helpful comments. This research was supported by the 
Smith School. The authors alone are responsible for the views expressed in this paper. 
  
EPRG 1323
1 
 
Does Using the Social Cost of Carbon Matter?: 
An Assessment of U.S. Policy 
 
Robert W. Hahn and Robert A. Ritz 
1. Introduction 
Economists have long supported policies that incentivize individuals and organizations 
to consider the full costs of their actions on society (Coase, 1960). This is particularly 
true where there may be large divergences between private and social costs, as is the 
case with many environmental problems. Almost a century ago, Pigou (1920) argued 
that one way to appropriately incentivize economic agents to consider the full costs of 
their actions is to impose taxes on activities that fully reflect their marginal damages to 
society.  
In the case of climate change, a growing number of economists have argued for 
introducing market-based mechanisms, such as taxes or cap-and-trade systems, as 
ways of limiting greenhouse gas emissions (Anthoff et al., 2011b; Metcalf and 
Weisbach, 2009; Pizer, 2002;, and Stavins, 2007). These mechanisms have been tried 
in various places, notably Europe, with varying degrees of success (Ellerman and 
Buchner, 2007). 
Absent an economy-wide incentive scheme, governments can account for greenhouse 
gas emissions by adding a measure of the marginal damages from climate change in 
benefit-cost analyses. Economists have argued that such environmental damages 
should be explicitly included in benefit-cost analysis to the extent that they can be 
quantified (Arrow et al., 1996). For example, a government might consider a regulation 
to increase fuel economy standards for automobiles, and include the reduction in 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions as an additional benefit that has a monetary value.  
To perform such an analysis, that government would need to attach a value to a ton of 
CO2 reductions. One such value is “the social cost of carbon”, or SCC, which measures 
the monetized damages associated with emitting a specified quantity of carbon dioxide 
emissions into the atmosphere (e.g., Hope, 2006; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000). There 
has been much work on the appropriate value of the social cost of carbon (Tol, 2009, 
Anthoff et al., 2011a, Greenstone, Kopits, and Wolverton, 2013, Sunstein, 2013). For 
example, Greenstone, Kopits, and Wolverton (2013) note that the U.S. government 
used a central estimate of $21 per metric ton for global damages from CO2 emissions in 
2010 (2007$).1 
                                            
1 A more recent update by the U.S. Government argues that the social cost of carbon in 
regulatory analysis should be at least 50 percent higher than initial estimates 
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While there has been much debate on the appropriate value of the social cost of 
carbon, there has been much less work on the actual use of the social cost of carbon in 
the design of policy. Watkiss and Downing (2008) examine the social cost of carbon in 
UK policy while Watkiss and Hope (2011) examine more broadly how the social cost of 
carbon is used in regulatory deliberations. Watkiss and Hope (2011) note that several 
countries use a global social cost of carbon for different regulatory activities; examples 
include the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Finland, and Italy. 
They offer a number of interesting insights on the SCC including: how its value has 
changed over time; the importance of SCC values in different sectors; trade-offs in 
using ranges and point estimates for the SCC; and examples where use of the SCC 
appears to have changed the results of a particular benefit-cost analysis. However, their 
analysis is based primarily on examples, rather than an exhaustive review of all 
regulations or policies. Existing studies are not designed to test the overall impact of 
using the SCC on a nation’s policy choices. Our paper seeks to fill this gap in the 
literature. 
We provide a detailed analysis of how the use of the social cost of carbon has affected 
the economic analysis of U.S. regulations. To our knowledge, this paper provides the 
first systematic test of the extent to which applying the social cost of carbon has 
affected national policy. Our sample includes the entire set of significant federal 
regulations that consider the social cost of carbon in the United States, beginning in 
2008 – when this policy was first implemented. These regulations typically have an 
annual economic impact of at least $100 million.2  
To assess how outcomes were affected, we examine net benefits of all significant 
federal regulatory policies from 2008 through 2013. We consider 53 regulatory policies, 
with and without including estimates of the benefits associated with changes in carbon 
dioxide emissions. Over half of the policies we consider set energy conservation 
standards for commercial or residential items such as electric motors or dishwashers.  
Most of the remaining policies set limits on hazardous pollutants from large entities, 
such as petroleum refineries or electric utilities.  
We examine whether inclusion of the benefits from carbon dioxide emissions changes 
the sign of the net benefits for each regulatory policy. Using this measure, we obtain the 
                                                                                                                                             
(Interagency Working Group, 2013). These new values for the SCC are used in 
analyses of regulations beginning in 2013.  
2 We use the term “economically significant federal regulation” to denote a “significant 
regulatory action” as defined by Executive Order 12866. These include actions that may 
result in a rule that has “an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or 
adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, 
competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal 
governments or communities” (3 C.F.R. 638).  
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surprising result that including the benefits from estimated changes in carbon dioxide 
emissions does not generally change the sign of quantified net benefits relative to the 
status quo. Put differently, in almost all cases, estimated net benefits are positive both 
with and without the social cost of carbon. This finding provides support for the view that 
the SCC has not had a big effect on actual U.S. policy to date. 
We then consider whether the SCC changes the ranking of different policy alternatives 
within a given regulatory policy based on their expected net benefits. In other words, 
has the SCC led to changes in the details of a regulatory policy? We find some 
evidence that it does change economic rankings of alternatives in a small number of 
cases. Whether this led to a change in the actual regulatory decision is less clear 
because, as we discuss below, there are many factors that go into such a decision, not 
simply the expected net benefits of the policy.  
Based on this evidence and analysis, we argue that the SCC does not appear to have 
had a significant impact on U.S. policy between 2008, when it was first used, and the 
beginning of 2013. We offer an explanation for the finding related to the underlying 
political economy of regulation in the U.S. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the analytical approach, and Section 
3 presents the main results. Section 4 discusses some potential limitations of the results 
and the approach taken. Finally, Section 5 concludes and suggests areas for future 
research.  
2. Empirical methodology 
We begin by discussing the different ways in which incorporating the social cost of 
carbon could affect regulatory decision-making, and the extent to which these can be 
measured empirically. In general, the introduction of the SCC could affect (i) the 
regulations that are considered, (ii) the alternatives that are considered in designing a 
regulation, (iii) the ranking of those alternatives based on estimates of net benefits (i.e., 
the difference between benefits and costs), and (iv) the choice of a particular regulatory 
policy by the agency. 
We cannot observe the regulations under consideration, but do not believe that 
introducing the SCC has had much, if any, impact on these regulations. The reason is 
that the regulations under consideration are generally determined by laws or court 
decisions that require agencies to take a regulatory action. We also cannot observe 
whether the specific policy alternatives considered in a regulation were affected by 
introduction of the SCC, but we were unable to find discussions in regulations 
suggesting that this factor was prominent. In particular, we searched our sample of rules 
for explanations of why an agency selected a particular alternative.  We found 
explanations for many rules, none of which made reference to CO2 emissions or the 
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SCC.  Because some rules did not contain complete discussions of alternatives, 
however, we cannot categorically rule out that the SCC was a prominent factor in 
explaining a particular policy choice.  
However, we can observe how the SCC affected the ranking of alternatives based on 
net benefits for a number of regulatory policies, and we can also observe the choice of a 
particular regulatory policy. We discuss our approach to obtaining and analyzing this 
data in detail below. 
Our methodological approach for assessing the impact of the SCC relies on benefit-cost 
analyses prepared by regulatory agencies in the United States (Hahn and Tetlock, 
2008). The United States requires selected regulatory agencies to assess benefits and 
costs for all significant federal regulations, and to the extent possible, “propose or adopt 
a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended 
regulation justify its costs” (3 C.F.R. 638). 
The search algorithm for identifying specific benefit-cost analyses involved three steps, 
which are summarized in the flowchart in Figure 1. First, we identified the set of rules in 
our main sample by searching for rules that included a discussion of the social cost of 
carbon. Second, we identified benefit-cost analyses within those rules that permitted a 
comparison of the policy choice made by the government with the status quo. Third, we 
identified benefit-cost analyses within those rules that allowed us to examine whether 
the relative ranking of policy alternatives changes with the inclusion of benefits from 
CO2.  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
To identify rules in the main sample, we searched the U.S. Federal Register (which lists 
all regulations) for rules containing the phrase “social cost of carbon” or “social cost of 
CO2.” We searched for proposed and final rules.3 We then searched regulations.gov 
(which contains all supporting material for regulations) for supporting documents 
containing the same phrases. When we found documents that corresponded to rules 
not found in the Federal Register, we added the rules associated with these documents 
to our sample. 
We included proposed rules in our main sample only where final rules had not been 
issued, because proposed rules are usually very similar to final rules. We found rules 
from three regulatory agencies: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the 
Department of Energy (DOE), and the Department of Transportation (DOT).    
                                            
3 A proposed rule is a regulation that that the government has proposed, but has not 
received final approval from the executive branch. A final rule is a regulation that the 
government has finalized and is scheduled to be implemented. 
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We searched all rules for complete benefit-cost information, with and without the 
economic benefits of changes in CO2 emissions included.  We found 23 proposed and 
29 final rules between May 2008 and April 2013 that provided an estimate of quantified 
benefits and costs for the policy selected by the agency.4  Sixteen proposed rules were 
associated with final rules. We did not include the analyses from these proposed rules 
in our main sample because in most cases they were very similar to the analyses in the 
final rule. This left a total of 36 rules (29 plus 23 less 16) in our main sample. While we 
did not include the matching proposed rules in this sample, we did check these 
proposed rules to see that they are consistent with the findings presented below. We 
report these results in a sensitivity analysis.  
Our main analysis compared net benefits of the policy actually selected with the status 
quo. Since rules often contained multiple benefit-cost estimates for a given policy, we 
developed a procedure for choosing between them. We have retained a fuller record of 
our work in an Excel spreadsheet, available upon request.  The spreadsheet contains a 
complete list of the rules we reviewed along with explanations of our judgments about 
what to include. 
We identified benefit-cost analyses at the highest level of aggregation for which the 
agency provided sufficient information on net benefits. We chose the highest level of 
aggregation to be conservative on the size of the sample. For example, we recorded 
fuel economy standards for heavy-duty vehicles as a single observation rather than 
recording separate observations for pickup trucks and vans, vocational vehicles, and 
tractors. This approach yielded a total of 53 benefit-cost analyses, which are 
summarized in Table A1.  
Some rules presented a benefit-cost analysis for two different time frames. We reported 
the analysis that covered the lifetime of the products subject to the rule. However, we 
checked that our conclusions held under alternative estimates of net benefits that were 
provided in the rule.  
On occasion, an agency conducted two benefit-cost analyses for the same product over 
the same period, but using different assumptions.  For example, DOT sometimes 
provided one analysis that accounted for vehicle manufacturers’ voluntary adoption of 
                                            
4 We found one rule with no net benefits. EPA asserted that owners of electricity 
generating units would meet certain greenhouse-gas emissions standards even in the 
rule’s absence, so the rule would not affect their behavior. We did not include this rule in 
our sample. We also found five final rules that provided incomplete information on costs 
and benefits.  In one case, DOT was unable to estimate net benefits; in two others, 
DOE chose not to estimate net benefits for the policy it selected because it had 
eliminated all other legally permissible alternatives. In the final two cases, EPA and 
DOT did not discount net benefits at 3%.  
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advanced technologies and one analysis that did not.  In these cases we deferred to the 
agency’s judgment: we recorded the benefit and cost data that the agency used to 
summarize the economic impact of the rule.  
The next step in our analysis was to compare the net benefits of selected and rejected 
policy alternatives with one another to assess the impact of including CO2 benefits on 
the ranking of policy alternatives. We first identified regulatory policies that quantified 
net benefits for at least two policy alternatives. In choosing particular benefit-cost 
analyses, we continued to follow the procedures described above. For example, we 
chose the benefit-cost analyses at the highest level of aggregation provided by the 
agency. This approach yielded a total of 202 policy alternatives for 43 policies.  
We took all the information on benefits and costs in the rules as given. The only change 
we made to the benefit and cost estimates was to adjust all values to 2011 dollars by 
using the GDP Deflators published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2013).  
Rules generally used real discount rates of 3% and 7%, and we recorded both.  
Values for the social cost of carbon have changed over time. We recorded the value 
that was used in the benefit-cost analysis. The SCC was first used in regulatory analysis 
in 2008. In 2009, the government assembled an interagency working group to estimate 
values for the social cost of carbon and help bring consistency to values used by 
regulatory agencies. This group issued a report in 2010. Agencies then used these SCC 
values to estimate the benefits from reducing CO2 emissions for selected regulatory 
activities (Greenstone, Kopits, and Wolverton, 2013). 
The interagency report directs agencies to use a global social cost of carbon, which 
considers global benefits from reducing a ton of carbon dioxide. The central value 
specified by the report is $21 (in 2007$) per metric ton of CO2 emissions reduction in 
2010.  It increases over time to reflect the greater marginal damages of global 
temperature changes associated with higher temperature levels. The discount rate used 
for determining the central value of the social cost of carbon is 3% (Interagency Working 
Group, 2010).  
From August 2009 until the release of the first interagency report, all agencies used a 
central value of $19 (in 2007$) per metric ton of CO2 emissions reduction in 2007. 
Before this, each agency chose its own SCC estimates. For example, EPA once used 
central estimates of $68 and $40 (2006$) for a ton of emissions in 2007. DOE once 
used a central estimate of $33 (2007$) for a ton of emissions in 2007. 
In some cases, an agency used both a global and a domestic SCC for valuation.  Unlike 
the global SCC value, the domestic value incorporates only benefits to the U.S., and is 
generally much lower than the global value. In those cases where a domestic value was 
presented, we continued to record data on the benefits and costs for global values of 
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the SCC. This choice is supported by the interagency report, which provides an 
estimate for the domestic SCC, but recommends that agencies use the global SCC in 
their central estimates (Interagency Working Group, 2010).  
Prior to the issuance of this report, however, DOE sometimes failed to draw a clear 
distinction between global and domestic values for the SCC.  The agency provided a 
range that included both, but stated that domestic values were likely to fall near the 
lower bound. Several rules used a range of $0 to $20. This approach made it impossible 
for us to separate the global estimates from the domestic ones, so we used the midpoint 
of the full range for our primary analysis. We also ran a sensitivity analysis in which we 
used the upper and lower bounds of the range. 
3. Results  
The quantitative analysis first examines whether use of the SCC has had an impact on 
the net benefits of the selected alternative compared with the status quo. It then 
examines whether use of the SCC has changed the relative ranking of policy 
alternatives, and whether this had an impact on policy. 
A. Comparing the selected alternative with the status quo 
A key result is that using the SCC in the regulatory analyses did not generally change 
the sign of the benefit-cost analysis for the selected alternative. This result is shown 
graphically in Figure 2, which shows the net benefits at a 3% discount rate for the 50 
benefit-cost analyses in the data set with positive net benefits. The observations are 
ranked in terms of increasing net benefits. Regulatory policies are only reported here if 
they provided a net benefit calculation and if they valued CO2 emissions changes in that 
calculation. In cases where a range of net benefits was presented at a 3% discount rate, 
we report the mid-point of those net benefits. The use of the mid-point does not affect 
our qualitative conclusions.  
The three benefit-cost analyses we found for which net benefits were negative are not 
reported in the figure. The policies set limits on the emissions of hazardous air 
pollutants from commercial and institutional boilers and steam electric power 
generators.5 Net benefits remained negative even after including the value of CO2 
benefits, consistent with the finding in Figure 2. EPA appears to have approved these 
policies because the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act require it to establish specific 
types of emissions standards for sources of hazardous pollutants.  These regulatory 
                                            
5 Two of these policies are from the same regulation: they define effluent limitation 
standards for new and existing steam electric power generators. All three policies are 
starred in Table A1. 
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decisions by EPA are consistent with regulatory executive orders that require agencies 
to select alternatives where benefits justify costs to the extent permitted by law. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
In addition to showing that the sign of the benefit-cost analysis does not change with the 
inclusion of CO2 benefits, Figure 2 reveals that the SCC has to date been applied to a 
very wide range of regulatory policies, for which net benefits vary over several orders of 
magnitude. The lowest net benefit for a regulatory policy was on the order of $10 million 
while a few regulatory policies had net benefits that approached $500 billion. 
Figure 3 takes the same regulatory policies shown in Figure 2, and computes CO2 
benefits as a percentage of total net benefits. The CO2 benefits average about 14% 
percent across all regulatory policies with a range of -1 to 70 percent. The few cases for 
which the CO2 net benefits are negative reflect a small increase in CO2 emissions from 
greater energy usage. For example, the “National Emission Standards for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants for Major Sources” cause a slight increase in CO2 emissions because 
boilers that meet the standards use slightly more energy than boilers that do not.   
We tried to explain the variation in CO2 benefits as a percentage of total net benefits 
across regulatory policies. We examined whether this difference might be explained by 
two factors – the agency proposing the regulatory policy and the major source of 
benefits from that policy. The major sources of benefits for regulatory policy were 
broken down into three categories: health benefits from reduced exposure to pollutants, 
fuel savings for vehicles and planes, and energy savings for equipment other than 
vehicles. We found that neither of these factors is important in explaining the variation in 
percentages across regulatory policies. 
 [FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The results for Figures 2 and 3 consider all rules that use the social cost of carbon. 
There are 3 rules that were explicitly motivated by climate change considerations. All 
are greenhouse gas emission standards for vehicles. Since each of these rules is 
estimated to yield substantial benefits from fuel savings for vehicle owners, each has 
positive net benefits before the addition of CO2 benefits. Consequently, restricting the 
analysis to these rules does not change our conclusions. 
We then considered the robustness of our conclusions in various dimensions, including 
changes in the discount rate; the level at which benefits and costs were aggregated; the 
use of different values for the SCC; and changes in the benefits associated with 
estimated fuel savings, which may be overstated. 
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Changes in the discount rate generally did not affect the qualitative results. We reported 
the results in Figures 2 and 3 using a 3% discount rate, but also considered what would 
happen using a 7% discount rate for conventional costs and benefits and a 3% discount 
rate applied to CO2 benefits.6  Since the regulations we considered had costs that were 
concentrated at the beginning, and benefits that were spread across a longer period of 
time, we found that net benefits at a 3% discount rate always exceeded net benefits at a 
7% discount rate.  We also found that CO2 benefits expressed as a percentage of net 
benefits were generally greater under a 7% discount rate than a 3% discount rate.  This 
happened because the government typically calculated CO2 benefits using a 3% 
discount rate, so the change from 3% to 7% reduced total net benefits, but did not affect 
CO2 benefits.  
We did find one class of equipment for which CO2 benefits changed the sign of net 
benefits when evaluated at a 7% discount rate: Class B beverage vending machines.  
Net benefits were relatively small in both cases, however; they went from -$3 million to 
$9 million with the addition of CO2 benefits.  
We considered whether the results shown in Figures 2 and 3 apply to policies that are 
evaluated at a lower level of aggregation. For example, we checked whether CO2 
benefits changed the sign of net benefits of fuel economy standards for several 
subcategories of heavy-duty vehicles. We performed the same exercise on 72 distinct 
disaggregated policies in the rules in our sample. In 70 of these cases, we found that 
the addition of CO2 benefits did not change the sign of net benefits at a 3% or a 7% 
discount rate. The exceptions were vending machines and commercial air conditioning 
and heating equipment.  
We considered what would happen if there were changes in the SCC. In this analysis, 
the answer is very little because most benefit-cost analyses we examined already pass 
a benefit-cost analysis without the addition of CO2 benefits, and in most cases, the CO2 
benefits were positive.  
Suppose, for example, the U.S. used a domestic SCC that was lower than a global 
SCC, but still a positive number, reflecting the assumption that the U.S. would get some 
domestic benefits from reducing a ton of CO2. Using a domestic SCC might be 
warranted if, for example, the U.S. wanted to focus solely on domestic net benefits, 
instead of including global benefits from CO2.  
                                            
6 Calculations for a 7% discount rate for CO2 benefits were not done in the most of the 
government analyses of regulations, so this is why we did not consider an analysis with 
a consistent discount rate across all benefits and costs. We also did not explicitly 
consider changes in uncertainty over the discount rate (Weitzman, 1995) because those 
data were not available. 
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For this analysis, use of a domestic SCC would not change our basic conclusion. It 
would simply reduce the value of CO2 benefits. Since these benefits did not generally 
change the sign of the net benefits of a regulatory policy, making the SCC value lower, 
but still positive, would have no effect on the sign of the benefit-cost results. Thus, 
considering the lower bound on the SCC estimate also would not affect the results.7  
As a final sensitivity, we considered one particular adjustment to the data regarding fuel 
savings, but did so using a bounding analysis. Fuel savings are a major benefit category 
in seven separate benefit-cost analyses included in five rules that we examined. 
However, there is some controversy over the correct way to account for fuel savings in 
certain purchases. Greenstone et al. (2013, p. 43) exclude private fuel savings because 
“many consider the question of how consumers account for fuel savings in their 
purchase decisions an unsettled empirical question.” 
Frequently, the value of fuel savings, and energy savings more generally, are based on 
engineering analysis. That may not be the right way to value such savings. For 
example, a consumer may value fuel savings from a new technology in an automobile, 
but she may also value other vehicle attributes, such as safety or lower emissions 
(Lave, 1984). If these other attributes are not taken into account in the benefit-cost 
analysis, then the rule may overstate the benefits by focusing on fuel savings alone. 
To address the issue that the estimated benefits from fuel savings may overstate actual 
benefits, we performed a sensitivity analysis on our data. We assumed the benefits from 
fuel savings were zero, which is likely to be an extreme assumption. We examined 7 
benefit-cost analyses by EPA and DOT that included fuel savings.  
 
These analyses covered greenhouse gas emissions standards and fuel economy 
standards for vehicles of different weights and model years. Each cited fuel savings as 
the greatest benefit of the standards in question. We found only 1 analysis in which CO2 
benefits played a decisive role (once fuel savings were omitted). This analysis covered 
greenhouse gas emissions standards for light-duty vehicles sold in model years 2017-
2025. 
 
Greenstone et al. (2013, p. 43) draw attention to this benefit-cost analysis, which they 
view as an example of “the impact that the SCC can have on regulatory decisions.” We 
draw a slightly different conclusion. Excluding fuel savings reveals that changes in the 
benefit-cost analysis are plausible under assumptions not used by the agency to 
                                            
7 Similar reasoning applies to using the upper bound of the SCC range. Because most 
of the regulatory policies had positive net benefits without including CO2 benefits, using 
a higher value for the SCC would not change the qualitative results. 
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determine its policy choice.8  
 
B. The SCC and the relative ranking of policy alternatives 
The analysis in Figures 2 and 3 focused on the impact of including CO2 benefits on the 
policy alternative that was actually selected within each regulation. As noted above, it is 
possible that the inclusion of CO2 benefits affected the relative ranking of policy 
alternatives that the government considered, and this change in ranking led to a change 
in the selection of a particular policy alternative. 
We addressed this issue in two ways. First, we searched the regulatory analyses for a 
discussion of net benefits that would suggest that the inclusion of CO2 benefits was an 
important or decisive factor in selecting the final policy. We found no such discussion in 
our search, which does not lend support to the notion that use of the SCC was a critical 
factor in decision making. Keywords and phrases used in our search included: social 
cost of carbon, CO2 emissions, and CO2 benefits. 
We also tried using a quantitative approach to this problem. We searched for policy 
analyses of rules, and parts of rules, that provided benefit and cost information on both 
the selected alternative and at least one rejected alternative.9 This exercise revealed 
that there is widespread variation across regulatory agencies in the extent to which they 
quantify the benefits of changes in the value of carbon dioxide emissions.  
We encountered two difficulties in this exercise.  First, EPA rarely provided estimates of 
net benefits for alternatives, and DOT rarely provided estimates of CO2 benefits for 
alternatives. For example, EPA did not provide net benefit estimates for alternative 
greenhouse gas emission standards for the same vehicles. DOT did not publish CO2 
benefit estimates for alternative fuel economy standards for light-duty vehicles in model 
                                            
8 Another interesting case arises with EPA greenhouse gas standards for vehicles. 
When issuing these standards, EPA always performed a sensitivity analysis on its own 
data. It assumed that the standards would be extended indefinitely and measured the 
net benefits through 2050. In all 3 cases, large fuel savings benefits ensured that the 
standards had positive net benefits before the addition of CO2 benefits. When we 
excluded fuel savings benefits, however, we found that the addition of CO2 benefits 
always changed the sign of net benefits. While we think this analysis is useful as a 
bounding exercise, we think the assumption that the same standards will be in place for 
such a long time period is unrealistic, and may lead to an overstatement of the benefits 
of those standards. 
9 In many cases, these regulatory alternatives differed in terms of the stringency of the 
standard. For example, the four alternatives to DOE’s energy conservation standards 
for residential clothes washers were simply more and less stringent versions of the final 
standards. The standards were defined in terms of energy savings and water savings 
targets that could be met with existing technologies that were on the market.  
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years 2012-2016. Even after checking regulatory impact analyses and technical support 
documents, we found sufficient information in only one-third of the rules issued by EPA 
or DOT.  We found sufficient information in all of the rules issued by DOE.  
Consequently, our data set for this exercise was heavily biased towards rules issued by 
DOE.10  
Second, agencies that did provide information on rejected alternatives often used a 
lower level of aggregation than they used in their presentation of selected alternatives. 
For example, DOE conducted three separate cost-benefit analyses for three different 
types of distribution transformers. Although the agency combined the three to obtain a 
net benefit estimate for the standards it selected, it did not do the same for standards it 
rejected. We addressed this problem by using the highest level of aggregation provided 
by the agency (i.e. the level of aggregation at which the agency actually made its 
decisions among various alternatives). If we had aggregated the data further, we would 
have lost useful information about decisions that considered a range of alternatives.  
Our final data set for this exercise contained 43 policies that provided benefit and cost 
information on at least one rejected alternative other than the status quo and the 
preferred policy. Of those 43, we found 12 policies for which the inclusion of CO2 
benefits actually changed the alternative that maximized quantitative net benefits. We 
also found 20 of 43 policies where the inclusion of CO2 benefits changed the relative 
ranking of at least 2 alternatives. This change in ranking suggests that the SCC had had 
some effect on the economic analysis.  
Determining whether the change in ranking had an impact on the actual policy choice is 
more difficult. For 6 of the 12 policies where including CO2 benefits actually changed the 
alternative that maximized net benefits, the alternative with the highest quantified net 
benefits was actually selected. On the surface, this finding might appear to lend some 
support for the hypothesis that CO2 benefits were important in the final policy decision 
for a small, but non-trivial group of policies.  
There is a problem with this conclusion, however. There is no requirement in the 
presidential executive order governing regulations that says the policy with the 
maximum quantifiable net benefits must be selected. Furthermore, sometimes statutes 
limit the scope for actually selecting the alternative that maximizes net benefits. In the 
case of energy conservation standards, for example, the DOE uses seven statutory 
factors to determine whether the benefits of an energy conservation standard exceed its 
                                            
10 We checked whether proposed rules contained more information on rejected 
alternatives than final rules did. In general, they did not. We found 38 proposed policies 
(36 of which were rules issued by DOE) that provided sufficient information on net 
benefits of rejected alternatives. We analyzed these policies, and found that they 
support our main qualitative findings.  
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burdens. Those factors are (1) the economic impact on manufacturers and consumers, 
(2) operating cost savings, (3) energy and water savings, (4) reduction in product utility 
or performance, (5) reduction in competition, (6) need of the nation to conserve energy 
and water, and (7) other factors deemed relevant by the Secretary of Energy (42 U.S.C. 
6295(o)(2)(B)(i)). DOE can use these factors to justify a decision even if it has not 
included that factor in the relevant net benefit estimates.  That is, it can conclude that 
the costs of a policy exceed its benefits even though its estimated net benefits are large 
and positive. 
To provide a benchmark for our comparison, we examined the 31 policies for which CO2 
benefits did not change the alternative that maximized quantified net benefits. 
Regulators only selected the alternative that maximized quantified net benefits in 19 of 
these cases. This benchmark helps us interpret the results of our exercise because it 
shows that the maximization of quantified net benefits is not necessary for selecting a 
particular alternative. Even though an agency sometimes chose the alternative that 
maximized net benefits with CO2 over the alternative that maximized net benefits 
without, there is little evidence that the addition of CO2 benefits affected its decision. It is 
possible that the agency would have selected the same alternative even if it had never 
considered CO2 benefits. This makes it difficult to interpret the impact of the SCC on the 
choice between regulatory alternatives. 
4. Discussion 
There are several issues related to the use of a global SCC. Here we address four: 
whether the use of a global benefit function in U.S. regulatory policy increases global 
welfare; the appropriate global welfare function; two adjustments to a global SCC that 
may be needed to improve benefit-cost analysis; and explaining the emergence of this 
policy innovation. 
One rationale for using a global SCC is that it could increase global welfare.11  We think 
that this argument could be true, if, for example, it is assumed that other countries do 
not change their behavior as a result of the U.S. policy. Alternatively, if the U.S. policy 
change encouraged other countries to follow suit, this might be a welfare-enhancing 
outcome both for the U.S. and the world.  
There is anecdotal evidence that Canada followed the lead of the U.S. in selecting a 
value for the SCC for in its analysis of heavy-duty vehicle and engine emission 
regulations. The Canada Gazette (2013) notes, “The values used by Environment 
Canada are based on the extensive work of the U.S. Interagency Working Group on the 
                                            
11 Using a global value would also apply, in principle, to other greenhouse gases, but 
research is only beginning to emerge on how to value such gases (Marten and 
Newbold, 2012). 
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Social Cost of Carbon.” If the U.S. is, indeed, influencing other countries’ decisions on 
the value of an SCC that they use, then the U.S. may want to take this into account in 
its policy choices, whether it choose to try to maximize domestic welfare or a measure 
of global welfare.  
A second issue concerns whether the use of the global social cost of carbon in 
regulatory benefit-cost analysis is appropriate for maximizing global economic welfare, 
as measured by the sum of producer and consumer surplus across countries. Even if 
one accepts that global welfare is the appropriate objective for U.S. policy, there is one 
important point that seems to have escaped the notice of analysts and regulators. 
Applying a global social cost of carbon helps address the environmental externality that 
the U.S. is imposing on other countries. There is a second “externality” that has not 
been considered, which is how U.S. actions could affect the cost of abatement in other 
countries, or more broadly, the cost of doing business in other countries. If the aim is 
indeed to maximize global welfare, a more complete analysis should consider costs as 
well as benefits for other countries. Perhaps, the U.S. decided these were second order 
or too hard to estimate, but we think such spillovers are worth considering.  
A third issue relates to how one might apply the SCC in benefit-cost analyses. Here, we 
address two concerns: the possibility that emissions may not decrease by the full 
amount typically assumed, and the impact of an imperfectly competitive market on the 
design of an optimal emissions tax.  
In some cases, use of a global SCC as the implicit global carbon price could, in 
principle, raise the cost of doing business in the U.S. relative to other countries, thus 
potentially leading to the export of some CO2-related pollution in trade-exposed sectors. 
Several scholars have noted the possibility of such “carbon leakage” and what might be 
done about it (Ritz, 2009; Helm, Hepburn and Ruta, 2012). The point we wish to make 
here is that this leakage may need to be taken into account in calculations of the 
appropriate price for CO2 in the U.S. and elsewhere. The leakage argument would tend 
to support a price that is less than the global SCC on gross emission reductions, 
depending on the estimate of the actual leakage rate. An alternative, equivalent way, of 
thinking about the problem is that the SCC should only be applied to the net reduction in 
emissions, after taking account of leakage. Up to this point, the SCC has been applied 
to gross emissions, and we think this could be problematic in that it over-estimates the 
actual carbon-reduction benefits of regulatory policy. 
Leakage could be a significant issue for some of the rules in our data set because they 
are likely to increase the costs of doing business in the United States.  Possible 
examples include standards for heavy-duty vehicles, incinerators, refineries, and 
hazardous air pollutants. Interestingly, however, very few of the regulatory policies we 
reviewed considered the leakage issue, and the Interagency Working Group document 
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on the SCC does not mention the word “leakage” (Interagency Working Group, 2010). 
We examined all of the proposed and final regulations to see how they treated the 
leakage issue. Four rules mentioned leakage as a potential problem.  One rule 
mentioned leakage as a result of the higher cost of doing business in the U.S. Three 
mentioned leakage as a result of a decrease in the U.S. demand for petroleum, which 
causes the global price of petroleum to fall and the foreign demand for petroleum to 
rise. None of the CO2 benefit calculations were adjusted in response, but the three most 
recent rules were accompanied by an Environmental Impact Statement that contained a 
rough estimate.  Each rule concluded that “the leakage effect is likely to offset only a 
modest fraction” of projected CO2 benefits (2017 and Later Model Year Light Duty 
Vehicle GHG and CAFE Standards, 2012, 63060). 
Like leakage, the issue of market structure poses important challenges for the 
application of an SCC in benefit-cost analysis that appear to have been largely 
neglected. A classic result due to Buchanan (1969) shows that the optimal emissions 
tax on a monopolist is lower than the social marginal damage--and in some cases may 
even be zero or negative (see also Barnett, 1980). The reason is that there are two 
market failures: the price put on emissions takes on the dual role of addressing both the 
environmental externality and the social losses from monopoly underproduction. 
Although things become more complicated, the same basic issue also arises with more 
realistic oligopolistic market structures (Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas, 1996). 
It may be appropriate for regulatory policy to ignore this additional market failure. Of 
course, the extent to which it matters will vary across different industries, and other 
policy instruments may be available that can address distortions due to market power 
more directly. But there is recent empirical evidence that Buchanan's argument may 
play an important role in the environmental regulation of U.S. industry. Davis and 
Muehlegger (2010), for example, find large price markups in U.S. natural gas 
distribution markets (both commercial and residential) across all 50 states. They 
suggest that these price schedules are "an important preexisting distortion which should 
be taken into account when evaluating carbon taxes and other policies aimed at 
addressing external costs."  
We also note that the market-structure point is likely to become more salient in the 
future, insofar as the values employed for the SCC, and emissions-pricing more 
generally, are likely to increase. Then, in addition to the static market-power effect 
identified by Buchanan, carbon regulation could affect U.S. industry dynamics, that is, 
firm entry and exit. Incorporating these kinds of effects is no doubt challenging but may 
also be important for achieving regulatory outcomes that increase expected net 
benefits. We therefore suggest that further policy on using the SCC might try to take 
market-structure issues into account. It could, for example, be desirable to use different 
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values of the SCC for different sectors, depending on differences in price-cost margins 
and other considerations. 
A fourth critical issue is why the U.S. chose to implement the social cost of carbon, 
given that it appears to have made little actual difference for policy to date. A complete 
analysis of the underlying political economy of this regulatory innovation is beyond the 
scope of this paper; however, we think there are various possible explanations as to 
why the executive branch unilaterally decided to value changes in emissions in CO2 
using the approach outlined above.  From a normative perspective, regulators may have 
thought it was appropriate to value carbon in federal regulatory decisions related to 
climate, taking into account global damages. The Interagency Working Group reports 
support this view.  
An alternative explanation, not necessarily inconsistent with the former motivation, is 
that the SCC may have been attractive for the executive branch to pursue because it 
gave the appearance of doing something on climate policy. At the same time, Congress 
may have found this acceptable because it probably had little real impact on policy, at 
least so far. If analyses using the SCC were to have a significant impact on policy, then 
Congress would be more likely to act if executive branch actions were not consistent 
with its preferences (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, 1987).  
A related question is why we observe the emergence of an interagency group to 
address the SCC issue. Here, we think the answer is more straightforward. There were 
inconsistencies in the values different regulatory agencies were using for the SCC, and 
the interagency group provided a solution to this problem. Furthermore, the group is in a 
good position to update values for the SCC as new information becomes available. 
5. Conclusion and areas for future research 
We evaluated a recent innovation in U.S. regulatory policy: the use of the social cost of 
carbon to value changes in emissions of carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas. To assess 
whether outcomes were affected, we considered net benefits for 53 regulatory policies 
from 2008 through 2013, with and without estimates of the benefits associated with 
changes in carbon dioxide emissions. We find that including the benefits from expected 
changes in carbon dioxide emissions does not typically affect the ranking of the 
preferred policy compared with the status quo. In some cases, including these benefits 
does change the relative ranking of different policy alternatives that the government 
considered. 
Overall, we do not find much evidence that using the social cost of carbon has mattered 
for the actual choice of policy in the U.S. The absence of a discernible impact may be 
explained, in part, because U.S. regulators have succeeded in selecting the “low-
hanging fruit,” where the net benefits of a policy that reduces carbon dioxide are 
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positive. In the future, the SCC could play a more important role in affecting policy 
choices. This situation could arise, for example, if U.S. regulators found that the benefits 
from fuel or energy savings overstated actual benefits or the SCC were to increase in 
value.  
A general limitation of our quantitative analysis is that we take the regulatory benefits 
and costs as performed by the agency as given. We do not know the biases that exist in 
these data; and there is relatively little work that provides a definitive assessment on the 
nature of these biases (e.g., Hahn and Tetlock, 2008). Thus, while we are confident 
arguing that adding in the SCC benefits has not made a difference to the sign of most 
benefit-cost analyses, that argument is conditional on taking the U.S. government’s 
analysis as given.  
We suggest two areas for future research. First, we think insights from the political 
economy of regulation could be fruitfully applied to the use of this regulatory innovation 
across countries (Joskow and Noll, 1981). If the SCC has made a difference in selected 
sectors or locations, what is it about the politics that might help explain these 
outcomes? And what might help explain decisions that have been largely delegated to 
civil servants? 
A second research question is whether U.S. policy makers should be trying to maximize 
domestic or global net benefits, and how these two strategies would differ in terms of 
their impact on domestic or global welfare. With the exception of the climate policy, 
most U.S. regulatory policy focuses on the impact on U.S. citizens. Perhaps this is 
because most U.S. regulations primarily affect its citizens. Still, other policy arenas in 
the U.S. that affect the welfare of citizens in other countries—such as defense, trade, 
and monetary policy—appear to be guided primarily by an assessment of the costs and 
benefits on U.S. citizens. Thus, it is not obvious why climate change should be treated 
differently. The fact that climate change may be closer to a pure global public good than 
some of these other examples may not, by itself, provide an adequate justification for 
treating it differently from a U.S. perspective. However, there may be ethical 
justifications for doing so (Broome, 2012). 
Use of the social cost of carbon in regulatory analysis is an important innovation that 
countries are implementing more widely. There is anecdotal evidence that the SCC has 
made an economic difference in some examples, but we would like to see more careful 
analysis of this issue in different sectors and countries. In particular, we conjecture that 
use of this mechanism would be more likely to make a difference in the regulation of 
carbon-intensive industries, such as the coal industry. Furthermore, if estimates of the 
SCC were higher relative to energy prices, including these costs could result in policies 
that promote more energy conservation. Given the apparent reluctance of politicians in 
many countries to introduce an explicit price on carbon dioxide emissions, we think that 
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researchers and policy makers should pay more attention to the role this tool could play 
in designing more efficient policies for addressing climate change. 
EPRG 1323
19 
 
References 
“2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule,” 77 Federal Register 
199 (15 October 2012), 62623–63200.  
Anthoff, David et al. 2011a. “Regional and Sectoral Estimates of the Social Cost of 
Carbon: An Application of FUND.” Kiel Institute for the World Economy 
Economics Discussion Paper 2011-18. 
Anthoff, David et al. 2011b. “Thinking Through the Climate Change Challenge.” 
VoxEU.org. http://www.voxeu.org/article/thinking-through-climate-change-
challenge. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. et al. 1996. “Is There a Role for Benefit-cost Analysis in 
Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?” Science 272 (5259): 221–222. 
Barnett, Andrew H. 1980. “The Pigouvian Tax Rule under Monopoly.” American 
Economic Review 70 (5): 1037–1041.  
Broome, John. 2012. Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World. W. W. Norton & 
Company. 
Buchanan, James M. 1969. “External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market 
Structure.” American Economic Review 59 (1): 174–177. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2005-2012. “Table 1.1.9. Implicit Price Deflators for 
Gross  Domestic Product.” United States Department of Commerce. 
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1#reqid=9&step=3&isuri=1
&903=13 (accessed May 5, 2013). 
Coase, Ronald H. 1960. “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law & Economics 3: 
1–44. 
Davis, Lucas W., and Erich Muehlegger. 2010. “Do Americans Consume Too Little 
Natural Gas? An Empirical Test of Marginal Cost Pricing.” The RAND Journal of 
Economics 41 (4): 791–810. 
Ellerman, A. Denny, and Barbara K. Buchner. 2007. “The European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results.” Review of 
Environmental Economics and Policy 1 (1) (January 1): 66–87. 
doi:10.1093/reep/rem003. 
“Energy Conservation Standards,” Title 42 U.S. Code, Sec. 6295. 2006 ed. Supp. IV, 
2010. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title42/pdf/USCODE-2010-
title42-chap77-subchapIII-partA-sec6295.pdf. 
Greenstone, Michael, Elizabeth Kopits, and Ann Wolverton. 2013. “Developing a Social 
Cost of Carbon for US Regulatory Analysis: A Methodology and Interpretation.” 
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 7 (1) (January 22): 23–46. 
doi:10.1093/reep/res015. 
EPRG 1323
20 
 
Hahn, Robert W., and Paul C. Tetlock. 2008. “Has Economic Analysis Improved 
Regulatory Decisions?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22 (1) (March): 67–84. 
doi:10.1257/jep.22.1.67. 
“Heavy-duty Vehicle and Engine Greenhouse Gas Emission Regulations.” 2013. 147 
Canada Gazette 6 (March 13, 2013). (SOR/2013-24). 
Helm, Dieter, Cameron Hepburn, and Giovanni Ruta. 2012. “Trade, Climate Change, 
and the Political Game Theory of Border Carbon Adjustments.” Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 28 (2) (June 20): 368–394. doi:10.1093/oxrep/grs013. 
Hope, Chris. 2006. “The Marginal Impact of CO2 from PAGE2002: An Integrated 
Assessment Model Incorporating the IPCC’s Five Reasons for Concern.” 
Integrated Assessment 6 (1) (January 31). 
http://journals.sfu.ca/int_assess/index.php/iaj/article/view/227. 
Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon. 2010. Social Cost of Carbon for 
Regulatory Impact Analysis under Executive Order 12866. February. United 
States Government. http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations/scc-tsd.pdf. 
Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon. 2013. Technical Update of Social 
Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis under Executive Order 12866. 
United States Government. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/social_cost_of_carbon_
for_ria_2013_update.pdf. 
Joskow, Paul L., and Roger G. Noll. 1981. “Regulation in Theory and Practice: An 
Overview.” In Studies in Public Regulation, edited by Fromm, Gary, 1–78. MIT 
Press. 
Katsoulacos, Yiannis, and Anastasios Xepapadeas. 1996. “Emission Taxes and Market 
Structure.” In Environmental Policy and Market Structure, edited by Carlo 
Carraro, Yiannis Katsoulacos, and Anastasios Xepapadeas, 3–22. Economics, 
Energy and Environment 4. Springer Netherlands. 
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-015-8642-9_1. 
Lave, Lester B. 1984. “Controlling Contradictions Among Regulations.” The American 
Economic Review 74 (3): 471–475. 
Marten, Alex L., and Stephen C. Newbold. 2012. “Estimating the Social Cost of non-
CO2 GHG Emissions: Methane and Nitrous Oxide.” Energy Policy 51 
(December): 957–972. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2012.09.073. 
McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "Administrative 
procedures as instruments of political control." Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization 3(2): 243-277. 
 Metcalf, Gilbert, and David Weisbach. 2009. “The Design of a Carbon Tax.” Harvard 
Environmental Law Review 33: 499-556.  
Nordhaus, William D., and Joseph Boyer. 2000. Warming the World: Economic Models 
of Global Warming. MIT Press. 
EPRG 1323
21 
 
Pigou, Arthur C. 1924. The Economics of Welfare. MacMillan. 
Pizer, William A. 2002. “Combining Price and Quantity Controls to Mitigate Global 
Climate Change.” Journal of Public Economics 85 (3) (September): 409–434. 
doi:10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00118-9. 
“Regulatory Planning and Review,” Title 3 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R), Pt. 
638. 2013 ed. 
Ritz, Robert A. 2009. “Carbon Leakage under Incomplete Environmental Regulation: An 
Industry-Level Approach.” University of Oxford Economics Series Working Paper 
461. 
Stavins, Robert. 2007. “A US Cap-and-trade System to Address Global Climate 
Change.” Brookings Institution Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007-13. 
Sunstein, Cass R. 2013. “The Real World Of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six 
Questions (And Almost As Many Answers).” 
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1133008.files/February%2019--
Cass%20Sunstein/SunsteinCasstheRealWorldOfCost_Benefit.pdf.  
Tol, Richard S. J. 2009. “The Economic Effects of Climate Change.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 23 (2) (April): 29–51. doi:10.1257/jep.23.2.29. 
Watkiss, Paul, and Chris Hope. 2011. “Using the Social Cost of Carbon in Regulatory 
Deliberations.” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 2 (6): 886–901. 
doi:10.1002/wcc.140. 
Watkiss, Paul, and Thomas Downing. 2008. “The Social Cost of Carbon: Valuation 
Estimates and Their Use in UK Policy.” Integrated Assessment 8 (1) (February 
6). http://journals.sfu.ca/int_assess/index.php/iaj/article/view/272.  
Weitzman, Martin. 1998. “Why the Far-Distant Future Should Be Discounted at Its 
Lowest Possible Rate.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
36 (3): 201-208.  
EPRG 1323
22 
 
Figure 1: Identification of benefit-cost analyses in the sample 
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Appendix - Table A1 
Summary of Benefit-Cost Analyses 
 
Agency / Yeara 
Rule ID 
Number Subjectb 
Net Benefits 
including CO2 
(Billions 2011$)c 
Net Benefits not 
including CO2 
(Billions 2011$) 
Final Rules         
DOE / 2013 1904–AC04 ECSd for Distribution Transformers 18 13 
EPA / 2013 2060–AR13  NESHAP for Boilers and Process Heaters 47 47 
EPA / 2012 2060–AQ54 GHG Emissions Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles 460 410 
DOT / 2012 2127–AK79 CAFE Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles 490 440 
EPA / 2012 2060–AN72 Standards of Performance for Petroleum Refineries 0.55 0.50 
DOE / 2012 1904–AB90  ECS for Residential Clothes Washers 35 32 
DOE / 2012 1904–AC64 ECS for Residential Dishwashers 0.56 0.47 
EPA / 2012 
2060–AP52; 
2060–AR31 NESHAP for Steam Generating Units 57 57 
DOE / 2011 1904–AB50  ECS for Fluorescent Lamp Ballasts 19 18 
DOE / 2011 1904–AB79 ECS for Residential Refrigeration Products 43 34 
EPA, DOT / 
2011 
2060–AP61; 
2127–AK74 GHG and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Vehicles 51 45 
EPA / 2011 2060–AP50  Interstate Transport of Particulate Matter and Ozone 210 210 
DOE / 2011 1904–AC06 
Energy Efficiency Standards for Residential Furnaces, A/C, and Heat Pumps 
Standards for Standby/Off Mode for Residential Furnaces, A/C, and Heat Pumps 
20 17 
1.5 1.2 
DOE / 2011 1904–AA89  
ECS for Residential Clothes Dryers 
ECS for Residential A/C 
3.7 
1.9 
3.2 
1.5 
EPA / 2011 2060–AO12  Standards of Performance and Emission Guidelines for Waste Incinerators 0.32 0.32 
EPA / 2011 2060–AQ25 NESHAP for Major Sources 38 38 
EPA / 2011 2060–AM44  NESHAP for Area Sources* -0.13 -0.13 
EPA, DOT / 
2010 
2127–AK50; 
2060–AP58 
CAFE Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles 
GHG Emissions Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles 
140 
200 
120 
180 
DOE / 2010 1904–AA90 
ECS for Residential Water Heaters 
ECS for Direct Heating Equipment 
ECS for Pool Heaters 
12 
1.6 
0.12 
9.1 
1.4 
0.11 
DOE / 2010 1904–AB70 ECS for Small Electric Motors 15 13 
DOE / 2010 1904–AB93 ECS for Commercial Clothes Washers 1.0 0.93 
EPA / 2010 
2060–AO15, 
2060–AO42 NESHAP and NSPS for Portland Cement Plants 13 13 
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EPA / 2010 2060–AO38 Control of Emissions from New Marine Compression-Ignition Engines 85 85 
DOT / 2010 2120–AI92 ADS-B Out Performance Requirements to Support Air Traffic Control Service 0.41 0.28 
DOE / 2009 1904–AB58 
ECS for Class A Beverage Vending Machines 
ECS for Class B Beverage Vending Machines 
0.66 
0.036 
0.49 
0.011 
DOE / 2009 1904–AA92 
ECS for General Service Fluorescent Lamps 
ECS for Incandescent Reflector Lamps 
51 
16 
39 
13 
DOE / 2009 1904–AB49 ECS for Conventional Cooking Products 0.91 0.78 
DOE / 2009 1904–AB59 ECS for Commercial Refrigeration Products 4.7 4.2 
DOE / 2009 1904–AB74 ECS for Certain Consumer Products and Commercial and Industrial Equipment 130 110 
DOE / 2008 1904–AB44 Packaged Terminal A/C and Heat Pump ECS 0.068 0.058 
 
Proposed Rules with no Final Rules in this data set     
DOE / 2013 1904–AC00 ECS for Metal Halide Lamp Fixtures 4.0 2.5 
EPA / 2013 2040–AF14 
Effluent Limitations Standards for new Steam Electric Power Generators* 
Effluent Limitations Standards for existing Steam Electric Power Generators* 
-0.79 
-0.27 
-0.89 
-0.30 
DOE / 2012 1904–AB57 
ECS for Class B,C,D,E External Power Supplies  
ECS for Class X External Power Supplies 
ECS for Class H External Power Supplies 
ECS for Class 1 Battery Chargers 
ECS for Class 2,3,4 Battery Chargers  
ECS for Class 5,6 Battery Chargers 
ECS for Class 7 Battery Chargers 
ECS for Class 8 Battery Chargers  
ECS for Class 10 Battery Chargers 
2.5 
0.41 
0.011 
0.76 
1.6 
5.4 
0.13 
2.8 
1.9 
1.6 
0.34 
0.010 
0.63 
1.3 
4.8 
0.12 
2.8 
1.6 
DOE / 2012 1904–AC07 ECS for Microwave Ovens 4.4 3.7 
EPA / 2011 
2060–AR15; 
2050–AG44 Solid Waste Incinerators: Reconsideration and Proposed Amendments 0.31 0.31 
EPA / 2011 2060–AN99  NESHAP for Mercury Cell Chlor-Alkali Plants 0.021 0.014 
EPA / 2010 2060–AP90 
Standards of Performance and Emission Guidelines for Sewage Sludge 
Incinerators 0.13 0.13 
 
                                            
* These rules are not shown in the figures because they have negative net benefits with and without valuing CO2. 
a Year of publication in the Federal Register. 
b For rules that contained a single central cost-benefit analysis, we report the subject of the rule.  Otherwise, we report the subject of the relevant subpart. 
c All estimates are rounded to two significant digits, and use a 3% discount rate. 
d ECS: Energy Conservation Standards; NESHAP: National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; CAFE: Corporate Average Fuel Economy; and  
NSPS: New Source Performance Standards. 
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